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Beyond legal transposition: Regulatory agencies and de 
facto convergence of EU rail liberalisation  
Fabrizio De Francesco and Graziella Castro 
ABSTRACT  Notwithstanding its maturity, the literature on European Union 
(EU) compliance tends to overlook the implementation stages beyond the legal 
transposition of single-market regulatory reforms. This article explains the cross-
national variation in the actual implementation of the EU regulatory reform of rail 
market among the EU-15. The empirical findings highlight the importance of the 
establishment of national regulatory agencies. Member states with an independent 
regulatory agency converge faster towards the EU model of liberalization. This 
conditional effect of EU railway harmonization is enhanced by the presence of new 
entrants that activate the institutional functions of national independent agencies as 
enforcers of EU legislation.  
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followed a long-lasting policy sequence. By fostering competition within domestic 
passenger markets by 2020, the 2013 &RPPLVVLRQ¶V proposal sets the final step towards 
complete liberalization, which has required three decades and four packages of 
regulatory reform. The previous experience in other network markets, in particular 
electricity, telecommunications and airlines, has defined the principles and elements of 
an open and competitive economic governance of railways (Dyrhauge 2013). The 
railway network of the European Union (EU) KDVEHHQGHVLJQHGWREHµLQGHSHQGHQWRI
national governments, with a transparent governance framework and non-
disFULPLQDWRU\UXOHV¶ Dyrhauge 2013: 72). In April 2016, the technical pillar of the 
fourth reform package was adopted and, as a result, the European Union Agency for 
Railway (ERA) will play a greater role in ensuring the implementation and convergence 
towards the EU model of a fully open railway market.  
The implementation of EU regulatory reform is complex. Policy actor preferences are 
dispersed among levels of governance, and EU decision-making is specialised by 
sectors and policies (Vollaard and Sindbjerg Martinsen 2014). Reform objectives are 
often ambiguous, allowing sufficient discretion to member states for them to delay 
(Kaeding 2006) and relax the legal transposition (Zhelyazkova 2013) as well as the 
technical harmonization (Versluis 2007) of EU single-market directives. As a result, 
QDWLRQDO JRYHUQPHQWV¶ HIIRUWV WR comply with the successive steps of liberalisation 
towards the market opening should not be taken for granted. Indeed, several scholars 
have shown that the legal transposition of the EU rail policy at the national level has 
been uneven (Héritier, A. et al.; Kaeding 2006). Beyond the legal transposition, new 
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entrants have faced many obstacles in accessing national rail markets because of the 
dominant position of incumbent companies (Dyrhauge 2013: 72).  
This article focuses on administrative practices necessary for the actual implementation 
of and the compliance with EU rail policy. In order to analyse the variation in the 
enforcement and monitoring of market operators (Falkner et al. 2005: 12, Treib 2008), 
the extent of access to rail markets is measured from the perspective of a new entrant 
in national markets (see section 4.1 for a detailed illustration of the dependent variable). 
Although EU compliance studies revolve around well defined theoretical arguments for 
H[SODLQLQJYDULDWLRQLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWK(8OHJLVODWLRQWKHµODZLQDFWLRQ¶9HUVOXLV 
2007) and the implementation stages beyond the punctual and correct legal 
transposition of regulation have generally been overlooked (Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 
2008). This is because it is often difficult to generate reliable and representative data 
on technical harmonization and enforcement of EU legislation at the national level. 
Accordingly, time-series cross-sectional analyses tend to rely on the Commission¶V 
official statistics on notifications and infringements and, consequently, to focus on the 
timeliness or the correctness of transposition (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009).  
EU compliance analyses are a relevant part of Europeanization studies (Saurugger 
2015). Following Börzel and Risse (2000: 3), we conceptualize (XURSHDQL]DWLRQDVµD
process of institution-EXLOGLQJDWWKH(XURSHDQOHYHO¶WKDWµLPSDFWVXSRQWKHPHPEHU
VWDWHV¶E\LQGXFLQJVXEVWDQWLDOpolicy change, and ultimately policy convergence, if the 
researcher is able to observe among EU member states an increased similarity over time 
(Holzinger 2006, Kahn-Nisser 2015, Paezold and Van Vliet 2014).  
%XLOGLQJ RQ 3OPSHU DQG 6FKQHLGHU¶V  models that estimates  ³FDWFKLQJ-XS´
convergence (see section 4.4) and probing two institutions and key principles of the EU 
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railway liberalization, i.e., vertical separation and independence of sectoral regulatory 
agencies,1 we aim to contribute to the EU compliance literature by analysing de facto 
convergence, i.e. a decrease in the variation in administrative operations and regulatory 
enforcement practices across the fifteen µold¶ EU member states (EU-15) over time 
(Figure 1). Given that the purpose of this article is to estimate the extent of rail market 
convergence in line with the three successive reform packages (see section 2), we 
include in the sample the EU-15, the only member states that have experienced the 
entire process of liberalization. The remaining member states have been excluded 
because EU accession and the acquis communautaire forced compliance into a much 
shorter time frame, making comparison with the EU-15 untenable. Furthermore, it 
would be hard to isolate the impact of EU accession from broader regulatory reform 
stemming from also the financial distress associated with the economic transition 
(Amos 2005), as well as from the financial intervention of the European Investment 
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Amos 1995) 
occurred in Central Eastern European countries. 
The long and multi-staged process of EU rail liberalization is a crucial case for testing 
hypotheses concerning convergence induced by EU harmonization (Holzinger and 
Knill 2005). Rail networks have been historically characterised by different economic 
governance principles, as a result an analysis of de facto implementation requires 
account to be taken of the extent of competition within national rail markets. We show 
that convergence towards an open European railway is conditional on the establishment 
at the national level of sectoral independent regulatory agencies. Furthermore, since 
QDWLRQDO ,5$V¶ FDSDFLW\ RI REWDLQLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ DQG monitoring the access to 
railway markets depends on complaints for discriminatory practices, this convergence 
process is enhanced by the presence of railway companies that exhort the enforcement 
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of railway liberalization. These findings are consistent with previous literature that 
shows the positive impact of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) on the 
implementation of EU rail liberalization (Nash 2008; Versluis and Tarr 2013). By 
highlighting the role of IRAs on railway policy convergence, this paper also contributes 
to an emerging literature on the impact of agentification on EU compliance (García 
Quesada 2014), the adoption of standards (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011), and the quality 
of regulatory governance (Guidi 2015; Vining, Laurin and Weimer 2015).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Focusing on vertical separation 
and independence of national regulators, the next section summarises the evolution of 
EU railway regulatory reform and highlights the ongoing process of convergence. 
Section 3 disentangles the causal factors driving convergence towards the EU economic 
railway governance model. Section 4 describes the data and the convergence models. 
Section 5 summarises the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes by providing 
recommendation for regulatory reform and arguing that EU compliance studies should 
analyse specific policy sectors, rather than aggregate and cross-policy sectors.  
EU RAILWAY REFORM AND THE INCOMPLETE PROCESS OF 
CONVERGE 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has been establishing a regulatory framework 
for a standardised competitive managed market within a single railway area. The aims 
RIWKH(8¶VVWHS-by-step regulatory reform and support-building strategy have been to 
increase the competitiveness of the rail transport system, and to foster a pattern of 
sustainable mobility. 
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The first step towards the creation of a Single European Railway Area was made 
through Directive 91/440/EEC which established the key principle of the vertical 
separation of accounts between the management of rail infrastructure and the provision 
of rail services.2  National governments transposed the directive by relying on different 
economic governance models for ensuring the independence of infrastructure manager 
from rail operators. Among the EU-15, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK has achieved a full institutional separation between the 
infrastructure manager and rail operators. Conversely, Austria, Germany and Italy have 
chosen a vertically-integrated model: the infrastructure manager and the incumbent rail 
operator are owned by a holding company purposely created for complying with the 
separation of accounts demanded by the directive.3  Several other countries lay in 
between these two extremes. Belgium, France and Luxembourg have opted for an 
economic governance model in which the infrastructure manager is independent but 
delegates several functions to the state-owned incumbent (Dyrhauge 2013: 46-47; Nash 
2008: 63; OECD 2013: 24).  
2QFHHVWDEOLVKHGWKHSULQFLSOHVRILQIUDVWUXFWXUHPDQDJHUV¶independence, the EU has 
pursued a gradual opening to competition and a progressive harmonization of technical 
and safety standards and administrative processes in order to increase the 
interoperability of national rail systems. Focusing on the rail freight, the first package 
of reform was enacted in 2001 and defined a trans-European rail freight network. To 
achieve a level playing field for new entrants, this package required the independence 
of the national authority responsible for the licensing process from the incumbent rail 
operator. In 2004, the second railway package increased the administrative 
transparency by furthering the specifications of freight railway interoperability and 
common safety standards, and by creating the European Railway Agency (ERA).  
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Beside vertical separation, the establishment of a European transnational network of 
regulatory agencies (comprised of the European agency, national enforcement agencies 
for ensuring interoperability and access to rail markets, as well as national railway 
safety authorities) is the other institutional innovation to reform the governance of 
national railways. The main function of the network of national rail agencies is to 
µPRQLWRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQDWWKHGRPHVWLFOHYHO¶9HUVOXLVDQG7DUU2013: 316). National 
regulatory agencies that are independent from both the incumbent rail company and 
from the political control can better ensure actual compliance at the national level with 
the full competition model designed in Brussels. In not vertically separated systems, 
µUDLOZD\UHJXODWRULVLQFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHLQFXPEHQWVDQGLWVPDLQUROHLVWRVXSSRUWQHZ
HQWUDQWVLQFDVHWKH\IHHOGLVFULPLQDWHGDJDLQVW¶)LQJHUDQGMessulam 2015: 16). 
The existence of a politically independent regulatory agency is not, though, a result of 
WKH WUDQVSRVLWLRQ SURFHVV µ'LUHFWLYH  VSHFLILFDOO\ SHUPLWV WKH UHJXODWRU\
function to be located within the Ministry, provided that it is independent from any 
³LQIUDVWUXFWXUH PDQDJHU FKDUJLQJ ERG\ DOORFDWLRQ ERG\ RU DSSOLFDQW´ 7KXs 
independence from political control is not required¶ (Nash 2008: 65). 4  
The regulatory reforms of freight rail paved the way for the third reform package, 
concerning the passenger market. The 2007 package established the service quality 
standard and the certification of train drivers operating within the EU, and introduced 
open access rights for international rail passenger services. Since 2010, cross-border 
rail passenger transport has been officially liberalised for all EU countries. International 
railway companies are now allowed to pick up national traffic in a country and drop the 
same passengers on a further stop in the same country before crossing borders.  
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In April 2016, the European Parliament approved the technical pillar of the fourth 
railway package. This regulatory reform aims at harmonizing the administrative 
processes concerning rail operators and rolling stock manufacturers. Acting as a one-
stop shop, the ERA will be empowered to issue market vehicle authorisations and safety 
certifications. The inter-institutional negotiations with the European Parliament and 
Council on the remaining pillars of governance and market opening are currently 
ongoing.  
Plotting an index of de facto access to national rail markets (see section 4.1), Figure 1 
shows there has been an incomplete convergence towards the final equilibrium of the 
fully liberalised and harmonised model. In 2011, the index still varies between 481 and 
850. Nonetheless, the process of convergence toward open railway markets is 
occurring, notably between 2007 and 2011, despite the fact that each package of 
regulatory reform demanded from member states considerable regulatory adjustments. 
The question is, then, whether vertical separation and the establishment of national 
regulatory agencies independent from the political control have influenced the speed 
and scope of catching-up convergence.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
EXPLAINING CONVERGENCE BEYOND LEGAL TRANSPOSITION 
Ensuring a level playing field for rail companies in the European single market requires 
compliance with technical standards and market access conditions through the 
administrative operations and enforcement at the national level of common regulatory 
standards (IBM 2011). The extent of vertical separation between infrastructure manager 
and rail incumbent can be regarded as an important driving factor for advancing the 
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process of liberalization (OECD 2012) and accelerating convergence, so that countries 
with a low level easiness to access their national railway markets show larger 
liberalization measures.  
We propose an alternative and nuanced explanation that refers to the institutional 
solution of national IRAs. Regulatory agencies that are independent from the political 
control and situated outside the ministry of transport can ensure an effective monitoring 
of compliance with liberalization measures. Furthermore, the EU network of national 
agencies brings about reputational costs and financial sanctions that in turn can 
outweigh the eventual gains obtained from non-compliance. This institutional variable 
can influence the speed of convergence, especially among countries that are lagging 
behind in the actual implementation of EU rail liberalization.  
IRAs are however not operating in an economic-political void. Therefore the presence 
of new entrants in national markets, the extent of institutional veto players and the 
density of trade unions are the other variables to take into account in order to explain 
convergence. The following subsections illustrate each of these determinants of 
convergence, arguing that the institutional and economic governance accounts need to 
be integrated in order to explain the convergence of railway reform among the EU-15.  
The conditional effect of national regulatory agencies  
Although the implementation of EU legislation lies with the member states, networks 
of national IRAs can be the solution to the lack of regulatory harmonization in a multi-
level context (Hobolth and Sindbjerg Martinsen 2013; Jensen 2007). Within the 
transgovernmental network concerning the EU rail area, the ERA has the potential to 
play several roles in order to enhance compliance (Versluis and Tarr 2013). From the 
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enforcement perspective, the ERA examines the transposition of several directives and 
has carried out cross-auditing pilots (Versluis and Tarr 2013). However, unlike other 
transport agencies it has no competence to inspect national authorities (Groenleer, 
Kaeding and Versluis 2010; Versluis and Tarr 2013: 324). From the perspective of 
administrative capacity, the ERA can facilitate strategies of administrative capacity 
building across national regulatory authorities by explaining and training on 
interoperability and safety standards. Finally, by exchanging best practices and 
disseminating information, the ERA can be perceived as a teacher of norms (Versluis 
and Tarr 2013). Accordingly, we expect the ERA and its network of national agencies 
to influence the speed of adjustment and the degree of policy change of member states.  
However, these roles can be played by the ERA only if national agencies are in place. 
Only national and independent agencies can effectively ensure the fulfilment of 
liberalization objectives through the progressive implementation and enforcement of 
measures designed to ensure competitiveness and openness in national rail markets. In 
other words, because the function of IRAs is to depoliticise decision-making 
concerning the governance of utility markets (Majone 1994), independence from the 
incumbent operator and from political control is crucial for achieving the goals of the 
regulatory reform promoted by the EU but implemented at the national level (Thatcher 
2002). Accordingly, an IRA tends to guarantee non-discriminatory market access for 
new entrants and to enhance the transparency of decisions concerning rail operator 
licences and safety standards. It also regulates infrastructure allocation procedures, 
supervises access fee costs, oversees disputes concerning train path allocations, and 
monitors the extent competition (Finger and Messulam 2015, IBM 2011). 
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Convergence towards the EU model requires that national rail markets be constantly 
adjusted to eventually meet the requirements of the EU reform packages. The political 
institutional capacity for regulatory reform depends on the institutional arrangements 
and is a moderating factor that partly explains the variation in FRXQWULHV¶UHVSRQVes to 
Europeanisation (Schmidt 2002: 898). As regulatory enforcers, national IRAs are the 
institutions responsible for ensuring the actual implementation of EU regulatory 
reform, and so play an essential role in de facto administrative operations and regulatory 
enforcement (García Quesada 2014).  
The fit with railway economic governance and the role of veto players 
The objective of EU railway reform is to increase the competitiveness of the railways. 
A previous comparative qualitative analysis of the implementation of the first directive 
(91/440/EEC) in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK emphasised the importance of 
the EU reform for providing solutions and legitimacy to national policy champions, as 
well as strategic opportunities to counter the opponents of liberalization (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2000). The promotion of these solutions and opportunities is facilitated by 
the extent of the fit between the European regulatory model and a given countr\¶V
µSROLF\OHJDFLHV¶6FKPLGW 2002) and the structure of national economic governance of 
the railway. Economic governance reforms are locked into path-dependent policy 
SUHIHUHQFHVEHFDXVHµHVWDEOLVKHGUDLOZD\DFWRUVKDYHDYHVWHGLQWHUHVWLQUHWDLQLQJWKH
status quo rather than accepting competition, which could lead to a diminished market 
position, reduced relationship with the state/government or ORVV RI HPSOR\PHQW¶
(Dyrhauge 2013: 12). As a result, endogenous political preferences of the EU member 
states are embodied in the features of economic governance of national railways.  
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HowevHU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V OHJLVODWLYH HIIRUWV WR RSHQ WKH UDLO PDUNHW have gone 
through a sequence of pragmatic stages of regulatory reform with the aim of abolishing 
the dominant position of the public-owned incumbent as well as the barriers to market 
entry. The former goal has been achieved indirectly through vertical separation; the 
latter has been pursued by allowing the establishment of new entrants in the rail market. 
This strategy for regulatory reform breached the political resistance of long-established 
vested interests by enlarging the number of rail actors. There are two explanations of 
the positive impact of new private entrants on market access. Firstly, instead of 
complaining to Directorate General Competition for abuse of dominant position by rail 
incumbents,5 new entrants have relied on national IRAs and competition authorities to 
demand non-discriminatory access conditions and consequently the de facto 
compliance with EU rail directives. Indeed, an IRA can enhance the transparency 
administrative procedure by obtaining information from the railway infrastructure 
managersµ+RZHYHUQHLWKHU$UWLFOHQRU$UWLFOHRI'LUHFWLYHRQWKH
developmHQWRIWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VUDLOZD\V requires that the regulatory body has powers 
to obtain information in the absence of any complaint or suspicion of infringement of 
WKRVHGLUHFWLYHVRU WKDWLPSRVHVSHQDOWLHV LQ WKHHYHQWRIDQ\ LQIULQJHPHQW¶ &DVH&
556/10 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany). In other words, an IRA 
can enhance administrative transparency only when a new entrant activates a 
µFRPSODLQW DQG FRUUHFWLRQ¶ SURFHVV (uropean Rail Freight Association 2014: 3). 
Secondly, new entrants can pursue lobbying activities towards national regulatory 
authorities in order to obtain a better access to the national railway network (Dyrhauge 
2013: 74-5). All in allµDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSUDFWLFHVFDQEHEURXJKWLQWROLQHZKHQFLWL]HQV
and businesses find it expedient to use the LQWHUQDOPDUNHW¶ Hobolth and Sindbjerg 
Martinsen 2013: 1411). Accordingly, we expect a positive association between the 
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number of railway operators and further administrative measures for enhancing market 
access.  
Beside the goodness of the economic governance fit, µYDULDWLRQV in national institutional 
opportunity structures¶ PD\ FRQVWUDLQDJLYHQ FRXQWU\¶V DGMXVWPHQt towards the EU 
model (Haverland 2000: 85, see also Schmidt 2002). Although European legal 
requirements cannot be ultimately disregarded, the extensiveness of domestic 
institutional veto points may delay the process of de facto convergence. Accordingly, 
we expect a negative association between the number of institutional veto players and 
further measures for liberalising rail markets. In this specific case of railway reform, a 
better operationalization of institution opportunity structures is the extent of trade union 
density. Although marginalized in the EU railway policy process, trade unions have 
been an influential interest group at the national level (Dyrhauge 2013: 70, Heritier et 
al. 2001). Through worker mobilization and the framing of railway as a public service, 
national trade unions have been usually opposing to the EU drive for liberalization 
(Connolly and Darlington 2012, Heritier et al. 2001). Accordingly, the de facto 
implementation of market liberalization may be relaxed in countries where trade unions 
are large and organized, especially in railway that is traditionally a highly unionized 
sector. 6 
OPERATIONALISATION, DATA AND METHOD 
Access Index 
Since 2002, the IBM Global Business Service has been gathering data in order to 
compare the extent of rail market openness in Europe. The dependent variable captures 
the changes of the Access index, a sub-index of the so-called Rail Liberalisation (LIB) 
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Index (IBM 2011). The Access index does not weigh market openness in absolute 
terms. 7 Instead, it gauges the compatibility of national liberalization measures with the 
provisions for the EU single railway market (IBM 2011: 16, 20). Specifically, the 
Access index compares the ease of market entry, looking at the time and costs necessary 
for a railway company which intends to enter a market as a newcomer to acquire 
licences and to operate. 8 
The Access index varies between 0 and 1000 (high scores represent lower de facto 
barriers in a given country) and has four editions (2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011). The 
first three editions are in concomitance with the EU reform packages. Accordingly, the 
index is dynamic and displays the actual changes in administrative and enforcement 
practices across EU member states in accordance with the changes in EU rail 
legislation. Although the Access index questionnaire distinguishes between the access 
requirements for rail passenger and freight transport, this separation is applied only at 
the level of the overall LIB index and not at the level of Access index. 9 The data used 
for the empirical analysis have been downloaded from the CESifo Group dataset 
website. 10 
Convergence, regulatory agencies and vertical separation 
The lagged level of the change in rail market access in a given country has been 
included in order to examine whether convergence occurs. A negative and significant 
coefficient of the (beta) convergence variable would indicate a process of adjustments 
wherein countries with lower level of compliance with market access tend over time to 
liberalise more. Turning to explanatory variables, all of them have been observed one 
year before the years of observation (2003, 2006 and 2010) in order to take into account 
problems of endogeneity. A dummy variable captures whether a given country has 
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established ownership or legal separation. This variable relies on the OECD indicators 
of regulation in energy, transport and communications (ETCR) that measure the extent 
of regulatory reform between 1975 and 2013. The dummy variable assumes value 1 
when the score of the ET&5 ³YHUWLFDO LQWHJUDWLRQ´ YDULDEOH HTXDOV  DWWHVWHG WR
ownership separation) or 3 (attested to legal separation), and value 0 in the case of 
accounting separation. Another dummy variable captures whether a country has chosen 
a full institutional separation (Nash 2008 and Dyrhauge 2013, and see Section 2). We 
also include a dummy variable that equals 1 when a given country established an IRA. 
With the exclusion of Ireland, the Online Appendix, available on the Taylor & Francis 
website, shows that there is a great variance in the timing of establishing a regulatory 
body independent from the political control.  
By interacting these dummy variables with the lagged level of the dependent variable, 
we can assess the effect of vertical separation and regulatory agencies on the rate of 
convergence (see Equation 2). We also expect that IRA is the institutional solution that 
would allows countries with low level of access to catch up with the de facto 
compliance. 
 
Rail market structure and veto players index 
The constraining effect of the economic governance misfit has been taken into account 
by including another index of the ETCR dataset. Specifically, ZHUHO\RQWKHµ0DUNHW
6WUXFWXUH¶VFRUH, which varies between 0 and 6 (the lower scores indicate a high level 
of competition among rail operators). This score is composed of two items, one 
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concerning the number of operators that compete in the passenger transport market, and 
the other the freight transport market.  
We also include in the model a veto player index, by using the revised version of 
7VHEHOLV¶VLQGH[SURSRVHGE\-DKQet al. (2014). This index comprises a time-variant 
veto player preference and includes information on institutional settings, such as a 
second chamber and a president of the executive, WKDW DUH µDQWLFLSDWH YHWR players¶. 
Finally, the measure of the trade union density, that is the proportion in percentage of 
employees in union, is an appropriate measure of representativeness for conducting a 
comparative analysis (Eurofound 2008), and is taken from Visser¶V (2013) dataset on 
institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social 
pacts. The Online Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, 
convergence and independent variables.  
METHODS 
Following PlümpeUDQG6FKQHLGHU¶VPRGHOV (formally presented in the Online 
Appendix), the estimation of beta-convergence proceeds in two steps: first we test the 
basic convergence model with control variables in order to ascertain the existence of 
convergence toward a equilibrium value (Schuster, Schmitt and Trau 2013); then we 
analyse the effect of vertical separation and IRAs on the speed of convergence.  
Panel datasets are highly at risk of correlated errors and violation of the assumption of 
the independence across observations, leading to biased estimates and misleading 
significance tests. According to the literature on panel datasets with ordinal dependent 
variables, we opted to apply the robust standard error procedure to address correlated 
and non-identically distributed errors in the analysis (Huber 1967; Beck 2008).  
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Table 1 summarizes the statistical results of the convergence regression models. In most 
of the models, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating a general trend of catching-up convergence among 
the EU-15; a trend in which the lower the Access index in t-1, the higher the rate of 
adjustment and compliance with EU directive. This trend is attested in Model 1, the 
basic model only with control variables of market structure, veto players and trade 
union density that shows a decent fit of the convergence model in explaining the 
variation of changes in rail market access. It is important to note the large and highly 
significant impact of the market structure score. Whereas veto players have no effect 
on convergence towards EU railway liberalization and trade union density is significant 
at the level p < 0.10 but in the opposite direction. Countries with large trade union 
density tend to have large adjustments in the de facto liberalization. However, this 
finding is not surprising. Previous comparative qualitative analyses of the legal 
implementation of directive 91/440/EEC VKRZHGKRZWKHWUDGHXQLRQV¶RSSRVLWLRQWR
EU railway liberalization model resulted in national policymakers enacting gold-
plating measures (Héritier et al. 2001). Specifically, two mechanisms explained this 
causal effect. Granted their ideological opposition to market liberalization and pursuit 
of a policy framing of railway as a public service, trade unions have two strategic 
choices. Trade unions may take a pragmatic approach by directing their mobilization 
efforts to WKHSURWHFWLRQRIZRUNHUV¶ZHOIDUHDQGVDODU\FRQGLWLRQV (Eurofond 2012: 39-
40). In order to achieve such results and being involved in the policy-making process, 
large trade unions may be willing to accommodate further liberalization of railway such 
as in the case of Germany (Teutsch 2001). Alternatively, trade unions may mobilize 
against the EU model of market and rail liberalization. But instead of constraining 
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liberalization measures, such a mobilization expedites the liberalization process. This 
occurred in France, where the strikes against directive 91/440/EEC maintained the 
liberalization issue in the political agenda. While politicians opposed to liberalization 
at the EU level, the national level policy was dominated by technical experts and 
sectorial civil servants who internalized and endorsed the European logic of market 
competitiveness (Douillet and Lehmkuhl 2001). The combination of both mechanisms 
may exist in the actual implementation of rail access since the technical nature of the 
issue. 
[Table 1 about here] 
This basic model only assesses whether the EU-15 are railway regulatory reform has 
experience a process of convergence among countries, without specifying which 
institution-dependent explanation increases the speed of adjustment towards of laggard 
countries. Accordingly, Model 2 and 3 summarize the results of convergence 
regressions where the presence of vertical separation and the presence of an IRA are µD
VWUXFWXUDO IDFWRU LQIOXHQFLQJ WKH UDWH RI DGMXVWPHQW¶ 3OPSHU DQG Schneider 2009: 
1003) towards the EU railway model.  
Does the convergence of rail liberalization policy depend on the vertical separation or 
on the presence of an IRA? Relying on the OECD data, Model 2A and 2B attests that 
vertical separation had a positive influence on the extent of regulatory change and 
facilitated market access for new entrants. Both the coefficients of the dummy variable 
and the interaction term are considerable, statistically significant and in the predicted 
direction. However, since the coefficient of the convergence variable is not statistically 
significant, these models do not capture the catching process evidenced by Figure 1 and 
the basic model of convergence. In other words, vertical separation is not an 
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institutional solution that allows lagging behind countries to speed up in opening access 
to rail markets. Indeed, it is a prerequisite common in all EU-15 for sustaining market 
liberalisation. We also controlled the conditional model of convergence according to 
the group of countries with full institutional separation (Model 2 C). This model with a 
static dummy variable shows that, although the convergence coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant, the interaction term is close to zero, not influencing the extent 
of policy change, and not statistically significant. Overall the two measures of vertical 
separation are ineffective in capturing the convergence process depicted in Figure 1 and 
in the Model 1. 11 
Conversely, according to the regression results reported in Model 3, IRAs have a strong 
impact on the adjustment speed. The coefficient of the lagged level of market access 
and the coefficient of the interaction variable are both negative and statistically 
significant. This means that IRAs speed up the degree of change in EU rail 
liberalisation. This effect is even stronger when we consider the trade union as control 
variable: The effect of IRAs on convergence is represented by the difference between 
the value -0.59 RIWKHȕ0 coefficient for countries with no IRAs and the value -0.92 of 
WKHȕ2 coefficient for countries with IRAs. Indeed, the effect of IRAs is given by -0.59 
+ (-0.33) = -0.92.  In other words, the change of the degree of convergence to rail 
liberalisation is faster in those countries where an IRAs has been established before the 
introduction of the EU reform packages. This conditional effect of IRAs can be 
explained also by looking at Figure 1 showing that the degree of variation among 
countries decreased notably between with the last two reform packages, in 
concomitance with the fact that most of EU-15 countries have established an IRA.  
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The impact of the rail market structure on the extent of change towards rail market 
access is remarkable and confirms the hypothesis that the presence of various rail 
companies pushes for further liberalization. This finding requires several qualitative 
evidences for further explaining the mechanisms of this causal relationship.12 For 
instance, in 2009 a French new entrant complained to the national competition authority 
that the Société nationale des chemins de fer français 61&)PDGHXVHRIFRPSHWLWRUV¶
µFRQILGHQWLDOLQIRUPDWLRQREWDined within the framework of its public infrastructure-
PDQDJHPHQWPLVVLRQ¶WRDGDSWWKHFRPPHUFLDOVWUDWHJ\of SNCF freight branch (OECD 
2013: 99). More recently, the complaint and correction process has engaged the French 
sectoral IRA that instructed the infrastructure manager to improve the process for 
allocating freight train paths (Barrow 2013).  
Since the 2000 liberalisation of the national passenger rail market, the Italian 
competition authority had been active in investigating and ascertaining abuses of 
dominant position by the Italian State infrastructure manager (Ferrovie dello Stato, FS) 
and its subsidiary rail service provider Trenitalia. In particular, a new entrant, Nuovo 
Trasporto Viaggiatori, brought a case against FS µDOOHJLQJ that the company was 
favouring the incumbent railway in the provision of access to its infrastructure, even 
EHIRUHODXQFKLQJLWVSDVVHQJHUVHUYLFHV¶2(&'2WKHUFRPSODLQVUHJDUGHG
the practices of Trenitalia WRRYHUODSZLWKWKHFRPSHWLWRUV¶VHUvices, by increasing and 
modifying train routes and frequencies, as well as the delay in dealing with the 
FRPSHWLWRU¶VUHTXHVWfor track allocations and unjustified obstacles to access stations 
services (OECD 2013: 130-1). This complaint activity induced FS to pledge to improve 
market access for the incumbents (Chiandoni 2013).  
CONCLUSION 
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Looking at the national administrative implementation and enforcement of EU rail 
liberalization, our empirical analysis shows that there is an ongoing process of 
convergence across the EU-15. While quantitative analyses of EU compliance are 
mainly focused on legal transposition across several policy domains, we have argued 
for a sector-specific focus on economic governance institutions such as vertical 
separation and IRAs. Relying on a similar institutional approach to Europeanization, 
we found that in Europe there is much less differential implementation as maintained 
by Héritier et al. (2001) in their analysis of the legal transposition of directive 
91/440/EEC. We show that the process of de facto convergence of EU-15 railways has 
been facilitated by the presence of IRAs. IRAs are an essential condition for EU 
regulatory networks to exert normative, socialisation and learning effects, in order to 
achieve compliance and harmonization. Contrarily to vertical separation, our 
convergence models show that national IRAs are a structural factor of catching-up 
process of convergence.  
Qualitative evidence attests that national IRAs facilitate and implement further market 
liberalization mainly if they are asked to do so by new rail entrants that are competing 
with market incumbents usually a previously public monopoly provider. In other words, 
the rail market structure is a factor driving convergence that enhances the conditional 
effect of the establishment at the national level of an IRA. Contrarily to the 
conventional wisdom, trade union density is associated with changes toward a more 
open rail market. The relevance of these variables is another reason to argue for sector-
specific analyses of the extent of compliance. 
This paper has also provided a contribution to the literature on the cross-sectional 
variation in the impact of regulatory agencies on policy objectives and outcome. With 
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few exceptions (García Quesada 2014; Guidi 2015; Vining, Laurin and Weimer 2015), 
our understanding of the role of IRAs is surprisingly limited to the explanations of and 
conditions for adopting and institutionalising IRAs. Focusing on national IRAs as the 
enforcers of EU legislation, we have tested whether the presence of a regulatory 
institution makes a difference for liberalising a traditional utility network such as the 
railway. Further studies should focus on the impact of this dimension of regulatory 
governance on policy outcomes, such as rail tariffs and the level of costumer 
satisfaction.  
Overall, this article provides practical recommendation for the fourth reform package: 
the political independence of regulator matters more than a full institutional separation 
in ensuring catching-up convergence toward an open and non-discriminatory EU rail 
market. However, the establishment of the ERA will occur when national IRAs have 
been effective in promoting liberalization.  The experience of national IRAs shows also 
that independent regulators cannot intervene without a complaint. Accordingly, a fully 
open access to passenger markets is necessary to be implemented concomitantly to the 
establishment of the ERA. 
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NOTES 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to focus on the key changes in 
economic governance structure.  
2 For a review of the evolution of the EU railway liberalization, see Dyrhauge 2013; 
Finger and Messlam 2015; Holvad 2009.  
3 This economic governance model has been considered by the European Court of 
Justice (Case C-556/10 Commission v Germany) as complying with the directive.  
4 In June 2008 the Commission sent letters of formal notice to 24 EU member states 
for their failure in implementing the first railway package. A large part of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQVUHJDUGHGWKHQDWLRQDOUHJXODWRU\ERGLHVWKDWGLGQRWKDYH
sufficient regulatory powers, sufficient mandate and resources to monitor competition, 
sufficient independence from the incumbent and/or infrastructure manager, and 
sufficient accessibility. 12 out of the EU-15 member states were subject to observations 
regarding regulatory bodies (Holvad 2009, 32-33).  
5 The cases of dominant position in railway have been so far limited and again the 
German incumbent Deutsche Bahn (Dyrhauge 2013:74). 
6 We controlled also for other institutional (size of central government as percentage 
of GDP and the World Bank regulatory quality indicator) and political (right or left 
government) variables. These variables are however statistically insignificant. 
 24 
7 Market openness as operationalized by the Access index revolves around the 
economic and law doctrine of non-discriminatory access for railway companies to 
essential facilities that requires specific regulation of the service sector and 
administrative practices. This theoretical insight allows data to be collected that are 
truly comparable across the EU-15 rail markets. 
8 The Access index is composed of the following four sub-indexes: information 
barriers, administrative barriers and operational barriers, share of domestic market 
accessible, and sales services in passenger transport. 
9 Moreover, the LIB index distinguishes the two market sectors only in 2007 and 2011. 
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Variable N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
ǻ,%0$FFHVV 45  64.73  145.77  -150  505 
IBM Access t-1  45  554.6  221.164  100  840  
Vertical separation dummy 
(one year lag) 45 0.73 0.48 0 1 
Full institutional separation 
dummy 45 0.47 0.50 0 1 
IRA dummy  
(one year lag) 45  0.29  0.458  0  1  
Market structure  
(one year lag) 45  3.63  2.272  0  6  
Veto players index 
(one year lag)  45  3.39  4.66  0  22.66  
Trade union density 






To assess the extent of catching-up convergence, we rely on the following, basic 
model, equation: 
 
 ?ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ? ߛ௞௄௄ୀଵ ݔ௜ǡ௧ǡ௞ ൅  ߳௜ǡ௧ (1) 
  
ZKHUHǻ\i,t is the change in the degree of liberalization in the rail market of country i. 
The coefficient ȕ of the variable yi,t-1 LHWKHFRXQWU\¶VOHYHORIUDLOPDUNHWDFFHVVLQ
the previous period of observation, represents the speed of adjustment. A negative and 
significant value of this coefficient implies convergence towards the EU model of 
railway governance. Given the limited number of observations, we included only few 
control variables: market structure, the number of institutional veto players and the 
GHQVLW\RIWUDGHXQLRQV$FFRUGLQJO\Ȗk is the coefficient of xi,t, i.e. the vector of the 
variables associated with rail market structure, veto players and trade union density; 
and ࣅi,t is an error process assumed be independent and identically distributed.  
To estimate the effect of vertical separation and the establishment of IRAs on the 
speed of adjustment (across the EU-15) towards the EU rail liberalization model, we 
rely on the following:  
 ?ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ߚ଴ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵݖ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵݖ௜ǡ௧ ൅  ? ߛ௞௄௄ୀଵ ݔ௜ǡ௧ǡ௞ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧ (2) 
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The interaction term, yi,t-1 zi,t, comprises the rate of convergence, depending on zi,t, the 
dummy variable indicating either vertical separation or the establishment of a national 
,5$$FFRUGLQJO\RXUPDLQH[SHFWDWLRQLVWKDWȕ2 ,Iȕ0 WKHQFRQYHUJHQFHLV
caused partly by the presence of IRAs and partly by other unobserved factors; iIȕ0 = 
0, then the converge process is entirely due to the constraint, zi,t.  
 
